One-Shot Perfect Secret Key Agreement for Finite Linear Sources by Chan, Chung et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
05
81
7v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
7 J
an
 20
19
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for Finite Linear Sources
Chung Chan, Navin Kashyap, Praneeth Kumar Vippathalla and Qiaoqiao Zhou
Abstract—We consider a non-asymptotic (one-shot) version
of the multiterminal secret key agreement problem on a finite
linear source model. In this model, the observation of each
terminal is a linear function of an underlying random vector
composed of finitely many i.i.d. uniform random variables.
Restricting the public discussion to be a linear function of the
terminals’ observations, we obtain a characterization of the
communication complexity (minimum number of symbols of
public discussion) of generating a secret key of maximum length.
The minimum discussion is achieved by a non-interactive protocol
in which each terminal first does a linear processing of its own
private observations, following which the terminals all execute a
discussion-optimal communication-for-omniscience protocol. The
secret key is finally obtained as a linear function of the vector
of all observations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of secret key agreement via public discussion
was first formulated for two terminals by Maurer [1] and
Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2], and subsequently extended to
multiple terminals by Csisza´r and Narayan [3]. In the set-
up of this problem, the terminals involved must agree upon a
secret key based on correlated observations from a source,
using interactive public discussion. The key must be kept
information-theoretically secure from an eavesdropper having
access to the public discussion. The conventional setting
allows unlimited public discussion, and the aim is to agree
upon a secret key of largest possible length. The problem
formulation is in fact asymptotic in nature: the terminals
observe an infinite sequence of i.i.d. realizations of the corre-
lated source random variables, and the asymptotic secret key
rate (number of symbols of secret key generated per source
realization) must be as large as possible. The largest possible
asymptotic key rate, termed the secrecy capacity, is by now
quite well understood [3, 4].
A more difficult problem is to determine the secrecy ca-
pacity under a constraint on the amount or rate of public
discussion allowed. Specifically, when the (asymptotic) rate
of public discussion is bounded above by R, the problem is to
determine the maximum achievable secret key rate CS(R),
which we term the rate-constrained secrecy capacity. This
problem was considered in the case of two terminals by Tyagi
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[5] and Liu et al. [6]. The primary focus of Tyagi [5] was
on the related problem of characterizing what we will call the
communication complexity RS, which is the least discussion
rate needed to achieve the (unconstrained) secrecy capacity; he
left open the rate-constrained secrecy capacity problem. Liu
et al. [6] gave a characterization of the achievable region of
key and discussion rate pairs using a notion of XY -concave
envelopes that they develop. They used their methods to give a
precise description of the ratio
CS(R)
R
in the regime of R→ 0.
The multiterminal CS(R) and RS problems were considered
in our prior works [7–10]. Among our contributions there were
some general outer bounds on the achievable rate region, and
upper and lower bounds on RS; in the special case of the
hypergraphical source model, we derived tighter upper bounds
on RS and the ratio
CS(R)
R
valid for all R > 0. In the important
special case of the pairwise independent network (PIN) model
(see e.g. [11]), our bounds were good enough to precisely
characterize RS and CS(R).
In this paper, we make further progress on these prob-
lems by focusing on the (multiterminal) finite linear source
model [12], which generalizes the hypergraphical source and
PIN models. In the finite linear model, the observation of each
terminal is a linear function of an underlying random vector
composed of finitely many i.i.d. uniform random variables.
Furthermore, we consider a non-asymptotic, single-shot ver-
sion of the secret key agreement problem as opposed to the
asymptotic version in [12]. In this version, the terminals ob-
serve only one realization of the source, and after some public
discussion, must agree (with probability 1) upon a secret key
that is statistically independent of the public communication.
Single-shot analogues of the RS and CS(R) problems can be
formulated in this setting — see Section II. We study these
problems with a view towards extending the results obtained
for the single-shot setting to the asymptotic model.
Courtade and Halford [13] formulated and analyzed the
single-shot secret key generation problem for hypergraphical
sources. They made a key assumption to facilitate their anal-
ysis, namely, that the communication from each terminal is a
linear function of its observations. Under this restriction, they
effectively resolved the single-shot RS and CS(R) problems
for hypergraphical sources. Note that linear discussion was
also considered in [12, 14] for finite linear sources, but the
objective was to achieve the unconstrained secrecy capacity
of the asymptotic model perfectly with a finite block length,
so as to avoid excessive delay in generating the secret key.
Taking inspiration from [13], we too restrict the public dis-
cussion to be a linear function of the terminals’ observations.
Under the linear discussion model, for finite linear sources,
we obtain a characterization (Corollary 2 in Section IV) of
the communication complexity of generating a secret key of
maximum length. The minimum discussion is achieved by a
non-interactive protocol in which each terminal first does a
linear processing of its own private observations, following
which the terminals all execute a (single-shot) discussion-
optimal communication-for-omniscience protocol on their lin-
early processed observations. At the end of this, each terminal
is able to recover the observations of all the other terminals
(omniscience), and it then applies a linear function to the entire
vector of observations to obtain a maximum-length secret key.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
contains the formal problem formulation, Section III presents
an illustrative example, and Section IV contains statements of
the main results, complete proofs of which can be found in
the appendices. The paper ends in Section V with a discussion
of the possible ways in which the results could be extended
to settings beyond that of our problem formulation.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We use the sans serif font K to represent a random variable
with distribution PK and taking values from a set K . We use
the boldface uppercaseM for matrices and boldface lowercase
san serif font for random row vectors x :=
[
x1 . . . xℓ(x)
]
where ℓ(x) denotes the length of the vector. We assume all
the entries take values from the same finite field Fq of order
q. We take logarithm log to base q and so all the information
quantities are in the units of log q bits. For a finite set B, we
use yB :=
[
yi1 . . . yi|B|
]
to denote a row vector obtained
by concatenating the row vectors yi’s for some enumeration
i1, . . . , i|B| of the set B. We use the notation
x ∈ ⟪yB⟫ or ⟪yi1 , . . . , yi|B|⟫
to mean that there exists a deterministic matrix M such that
x = yBM .
As in [3], the multiterminal secret key agreement problem
consists of a finite set V = {1, 2, . . . ,m} of m ≥ 2 users who
want to share a secret key after some public discussion that can
be eavesdropped by a wiretapper. The one-shot perfect linear
secret key agreement (SKA) scheme consists of the following
phases.
One-shot private observation: Each user i ∈ V observes the
component zi of a given finite linear source zV defined in [4]
with the requirement that
zi ∈ ⟪x⟫ ∀i ∈ V (1)
for some uniformly random vector x over Fq . x is referred to
as the base of zV . In the special case when zi is a subvector
of x, zV is called the hypergraphical source [4], which is the
source model considered in [13]. Unlike the model in [3] and
[12] where each user observes n i.i.d. samples of the source,
we consider the one-shot model as in [13, 15] where each user
only observes one sample.
Private randomization: Each user i ∈ V privately generates
a random vector ui over Fq independent of the source zV , i.e.,
PuV |zV =
∏
i∈V
Pui . (2)
Note that there is no restriction on the length nor the distri-
bution of ui, and so the requirement that it must be a vector
over Fq does not lose generality. Note also that such a ran-
domization was not explicitly considered in the formulations
of [3, 12, 13].
Linear public discussion: Each user i ∈ V publicly reveals
the message
fi ∈ ⟪ui, zi⟫. (3)
Hence, everyone including the wiretapper observes fV . Unlike
[3], the discussion above is non-interactive as interaction is
unnecessary for linear discussion as explained in [16].1
Secret key agreement After the public discussion, each user
i ∈ V attempts to agree on a secret key K satisfying
H(K|ui, zi, fV ) = 0 ∀i ∈ V
log|K| −H(K|fV ) = 0
(4)
(5)
where (4) is the recoverability constraint that requires the se-
cret key to be perfectly recoverable by every user and (5) is the
secrecy constraint that requires the key to be uniformly random
and perfectly independent of the entire public discussion. Note
that we do not assume apriori that K is a linear function of the
private source, and so the key length log|K| is not required
to be an integer.2
The objective is to characterize the set of achievable key
lengths and discussion lengths. In particular, a quantity of
interest is the constrained secrecy capacity defined as
cS(r) := cS(zV , r) := max{log|K| | ℓ(fV ) ≤ r}, (6)
where the maximization is over all possible secret key agree-
ment schemes subject to a constraint on the total public
discussion length, r. (Note that we omit the argument zV
if there is no ambiguity.) Characterizing the entire curve of
cS(r) is difficult even in the case of linear discussion, but
some points on the curve can be characterized, such as cS(0)
considered in [17]. As in [3, 12, 13], we also consider the
unconstrained secrecy capacity defined as
cS := cS(zV ) := max{cS(r) | r ≥ 0}, (7)
1Suppose the discussion is interactive, i.e., a message, say f , revealed in
public by some user i ∈ V is a linear function ψ(ui, zi, f˜) of the private
observations of user i as well as all the previously discussed messages denoted
by f˜ . By linearity, we can rewrite f as ψ(ui, zi,0) + ψ(0,0, f˜) where 0
denotes an all-zero vector of an appropriate length. Note that, given f˜ , there
is a bijection between f and f ′ := ψ(ui, zi, 0), and so user i can reveal f ′
instead of f in public without loss of generality, since f can be recovered
from f ′ and other discussion messages f˜ . As f ′ does not depend on f˜ , we can
convert any interactive discussion to a non-interactive discussion by replacing
every discussion message f by the corresponding f ′.
2Nevertheless, it will follow from Theorem 1 that K can be chosen to be
a linear function of the private source without loss of optimality, and so the
key length must be an integer.
which is the secrecy capacity without the constraint on the
discussion length. The smallest discussion length required to
achieve cS is denoted by
rS := rS(zV ) := inf{r ≥ 0 | cS(zV , r) = cS(zV )} (8)
and referred to as the communication complexity. As in [3,
13], we will characterize cS and rS using the closely related
problem of communication for omniscience defined as follows.
The problem under the one-shot model for hypergraphical and
finite linear sources is proposed in [15, 18] and referred to as
the cooperative data exchange.
Omniscience: We say that the public discussion achieves
omniscience of zV if
H(zV |ui, zi, fV ) = 0 ∀i ∈ V. (9)
The smallest length of communication for omniscience is
defined as
rCO := rCO(z) := min ℓ(fV ), (10)
where the minimization is over all public discussion schemes
subject to (9) in place of (5) and (4). In [3], the secret key
agreement scheme that achieves the capacity is by first achiev-
ing omniscience of zV and then extracting the secret key as a
function of zV , implying that the rate of communication for
omniscience is no smaller than the communication complexity.
We say that cS can be achieved via omniscience of zV .
III. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
We will use the following example to illustrate the problem
formulation and motivate our main results. Consider V =
{1, 2, 3, 4} and a finite linear source zV (see (1)) over the
binary field F2 with a base x of length ℓ(x) = 4 as follows:
z1 :=
[
x1 x2 ⊕ x3
]
z2 :=
[
x1 x2 ⊕ x4
]
z3 :=
[
x1 ⊕ x2 x3
]
z4 :=
[
x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4
]
.
(11)
A feasible secret key agreement scheme is to choose
K = x1, f1 =
[
x2 ⊕ x3
]
, and f2 =
[
x2 ⊕ x4
]
, (12)
but without any private randomizations uV and discussions
f3 and f4 by users 3 and 4. The secret key K is perfectly
recoverable by every user, i.e., satisfying (4), since users 1
and 2 directly observes the key bit x1, which can also be
computed by users 3 and 4 using their private sources and
public discussion as follows
x1 =
[
x1 ⊕ x2 x3 x2 ⊕ x3
]11
1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
z3
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f1
=
[
x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4 x2 ⊕ x3 x2 ⊕ x4
]11
1
 .︸ ︷︷ ︸
z4
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f2
The secrecy constraint (5) also holds because log|K| = 1 =
H(K|fV ), which follows from the definition of the base x that
x1 is uniformly random and independent of x2, x3, and x4.
Note that the above scheme does not achieve the omni-
science condition in (9) because users 1, 2 and 4 cannot
recover x3 after the discussion. However, it is easy to show
that omniscience can be achieved if we further set f3 =
[
x3
]
,
i.e., with an additional bit of discussion by user 3. Since 1 bit
of secret key can be achieved with 2 bits of public discussion
and omniscience can be further achieved with an additional
bit of discussion, we have
cS(rCO) ≥
{
1 r ≥ 2
0 r < 2
, and

cS ≥ 1
rS ≤ 2
rCO ≤ 3
(13)
by the definitions (6), (7), (8) and (10). The challenge is
to show the reverse inequalities and therefore establish the
optimality of the achieving schemes.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
We start with some rather general admissible conditions that
simplify the secret key agreement scheme significantly without
loss of optimality.
Theorem 1 cS(r) remains unchanged even if we set
ℓ(ui) = 0 ∀i ∈ V, and
K = k ∈ ⟪zV ⟫,
(14a)
(14b)
which mean respectively that private randomizations are not
needed and that the secret key can be chosen to be linear
function of the private source. ✷
Corollary 1 cS(r) must be integer, non-decreasing and right
continuous in r. ✷
PROOF For the corollary, the fact that cS(r) must be an integer
follows from (14b) that the key can be linear and therefore a
uniformly random vector by the secrecy constraint (5). Monon-
tonicity and continuity follows directly from the definition (6).
The proof of the theorem is more involved and given in
Appendix A. 
For instance, the example in Section III considers such a
secret key agreement scheme without private randomization.
The secret key x1 is also linear in the private source trivially
because it is directly observed by users 1 and 2. Note that our
formulation allows the private randomizations to have arbitrary
length and distribution, and the key to be arbitrary random
variables that need not be linear in the private source. The
above admissible constraints (14) makes the problem tractable
as it significantly reduces the space of secret key agreement
schemes we need to consider to characterize cS(r). Indeed,
since there is only a finite number of linear functions of
zV , there is only a finite number of admissible secret key
agreement scheme. It is worth noting that the constraints (14)
were assumed in the formulation of [13] for the hypergraphical
source model, and our result implies that such constraints are
admissible since hypergraphical sources are special case of the
finite linear sources.
For the general source model in [3], the admissible con-
straint (14a) that private randomization does not help improve
cS(r) remains a plausible conjecture. However, it is clear that
the constraint (14b) is not admissible for some sources that
are not finite linear. Nevertheless, this constraint is essential
in bringing the existing characterizations of the capacity from
the general source model to the one-shot finite linear source
model as follows.
Theorem 2 cS(r) in the extreme cases with 0 and respectively
unbounded discussion lengths are
cS(0) = max{H(g) | g ∈ ⟪zi⟫, ∀i ∈ V }
cS =
⌊
min
P∈Π′(V )
∑
C∈P H(zC)−H(zV )
|P| − 1
⌋
,
(15)
(16)
where the maximization is over the choices of random vector g,
and the minimization is over the collection Π′(V ) of partitions
of V into at least two non-empty disjoint sets. Furthermore,
cS can be achieved via communication for omniscience of zV
at the smallest length
rCO = H(zV )− cS, (17)
which implies the upper bound rS ≤ rCO on rS. ✷
PROOF See Appendix B. 
For the running example given in Section III, it is straight-
forward to evaluate the above expressions (15), (16) and (17)
to yield cS(0) = 0, cS = 1 and rCO = 3. In particular, an opti-
mal solution to (16) can be shown to be P = {{1, 2, 3}, {4}}.
This implies the optimality of the omniscience scheme in
Section III in achieving both cS and rCO.
The above result follows quite directly from existing works
for the asymptotic model. For instance, the r.h.s. of (15) is
the multivariate Ga´cs-Ko¨rner common information evaluated
for the finite linear source model. g is called the maximum
common function of zi for i ∈ V . cS(0) = JGK(zV ) was
shown in [17] but for the asymptotic model instead. It is
straightforward to extend this result to the current one-shot
model.
The duality (17) between secret key agreement and com-
munication for omniscience also follows directly from the
asymptotic model in [3], which is specialized to the asymptotic
finite linear source model in [12]. The characterization (16)
of cS is the same as that of the asymptotic model [3, 4]
except for the floor operation, since the minimization in (16)
may not be integer but cS must be integer by Corollary 1.
The characterization of rCO for the one-shot finite linear
source model is given in [15, 19], which focus primarily on
the omniscience problem instead of the secret key agreement
problem.
Note that one can summarize the theorem by saying that
cS(0), cS and rCO for the one-shot model is the same as
those of the asymptotic model for finite linear source but with
an additional integer constraint: CS(0) is already an integer
for the asymptotic model while we can take the floor and
the ceiling respectively for CS and RCO to turn them into
integer achievable lengths. It therefore appears reasonable to
conjecture that cS(r) for the one-shot model is the same as
the CS(R) for the asymptotic model for finite linear source
but with an additional floor operation as in (16) to satisfy the
integer constraint in Corollary 1. The following result resolves
this partially at the communication complexity rS.
Theorem 3 If rS < rCO, then there exists z
′
V with
z′i ∈ ⟪zi⟫ ∀i ∈ V (18)
such that
rS(z
′
V ) = rS(zV )
rCO(z
′
V ) < rCO(zV )
cS(z
′
V ) = cS(zV ).
(19)
(20)
(21)
z′V is said to be reduced source of zV (by linear processing),
since the above implies H(z′V ) < H(zV ). ✷
Corollary 2 The communication complexity is
rS = min{rCO(z
′
V ) | z
′
i ∈ ⟪zi⟫, cS(z
′
V ) = cS(zV )}, (22)
achieved via omniscience of the linearly reduced source z′V .✷
PROOF The corollary follows immediately from theorem by
repeatedly linearly reducing the source until rS = rCO. This
is possible since the theorem guarantees linear processing
of the source exists that can reduce rCO without changing
(cS, rS) whenever rS < rCO. For the proof of the theorem,
see Appendix C. 
For the running example in Section III, the omniscience
scheme does not achieve rS as rS ≤ 2 by the secret key agree-
ment scheme without omniscience described in Section III. As
rS < rCO, the theorem above guarantees a linear processing of
the source that reduces rCO without changing (cS, rS). Such
a linearly reduced source can be obtained with
z′3 = z3
[
1
1
]
= x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ∈ ⟪z3⟫
and z′i = zi for i ∈ 1, 2, 4. It is straightforward to show that
cS(z
′
V ) = 1 by (16) and rCO(z
′
V ) = 2 by (17). Note the
source is reduced in the sense that H(z′V ) = 3 < H(zV ).
By going through all possible independent linear processings
of zi’s, which is possible as there is only a finite number of
possibilities, one can show that the above defined z′V is optimal
to (22) achieving the minimum rCO, and so rS = 2 as desired
by the above corollary.
Note that the characterization of RS remains open for the
asymptotic model [3] but we believe that it can be resolved
for finite linear source model by extending the above result
to the asymptotic case. This means in particular that rS for
the one-shot model is the ceiling of the RS for the asymptotic
model. In Section V, we outline the challenges involved in
such extension.
V. EXTENSIONS
In this work, we considered the one-shot secret key agree-
ment problem under a finite linear source model with linear
public discussion, perfect secrecy and recoverability. How-
ever, we believe that all the results can be extended without
assuming the discussion is linear. In particular, extending
Theorem 2 is straightforward as the converse parts follow
from those of the asymptotic model without requiring the
discussion to be linear. Extending Theorem 1 and Theorem 3
appears challenging. The current proofs rely on the linearity
of discussion.
Another possible extension of the current results is to the
asymptotic model where users observe n ≥ 1 i.i.d. samples
znV :=
[
zV 1 . . . zV n
]
of the private source, and the
constrained secrecy capacity and discussion rate is per sample
of the observation, i.e.,
CS(R) := max
{
log|K|
n
∣∣∣∣ ℓ(fV )n ≤ R
}
.
The recoverability (4) and secrecy (5) constraints can also be
relaxed to the asymptotic versions in [3], i.e., for some positive
δn, ǫn → 0 as n→∞,
1
n
log|K| −H(K|fV ) ≤ δn
Pr (∃i ∈ V,K 6= φi(u, z
n
i , fV )) ≤ ǫn
for a sequence in n of secret key agreement schemes and some
functions φi for i ∈ V that user i uses to recover the secret
key. As mentioned below Theorem 2, the characterizations of
CS(0), CS and RCO are already known for the asymptotic
model and they are indeed used to derive the corresponding
characterizations for the one-shot model. We believe that the
other results in Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 can be extended.
The current proofs can be directly extended if we impose
perfect recoverability instead, i.e., with ǫn = 0 for sufficiently
large n. However, the proofs without assuming perfect re-
coverability remain elusive. What we desire is a proof that
perfect recoverability is admissible and can therefore be be
assumed without loss of optimality. In the similar vein, we
also desire a proof that RS can be achieved exactly, i.e., for
sufficiently large n, there exists a secret key agreement scheme
with 1
n
log|K| = CS and
ℓ(fV )
n
= RS, and that linear public
discussion is admissible.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
First we will show the admission constraint (14b), i.e., cS(r)
remains unchanged when the secret key is chosen to be linear
function of the private source. Consider any optimal SKA
scheme with a fixed discussion length r, i.e., with secret key K
having length cS(r) and discussion fV having length r. Define
yi :=
[
ui zi fV
]
.
By the recoverability constraint (4) of the secret key, K is
a common function of yi for i ∈ V . Trivially, fV is also
a common function of yi. Let g be a maximum common
function, as defined for Theorem 2, of yi’s instead of zi’s.
From [20], we know that any common function of yi is a
function of g. Hence (K, fV ) is a function of g i.e.,
H(K, fV |g) = 0. (23)
It was shown in [17] that g is a linear function for a finite linear
source, i.e., g ∈ ⟪yi⟫ or ⟪ui, zi, fV ⟫, ∀i ∈ V . Therefore,
g ∈ ⟪uV , zV ⟫.
In fact, fV is a linear function of g because of the linearity
of the communication, fV ∈ ⟪uV , zV ⟫, and the linearity of
the maximal common function g . We can therefore write,
fV ∈ ⟪g⟫.
We will show that the secret key rate remains unchanged if
we choose the secret key to be the linear function K′ = k′ ∈
⟪g⟫ such that
g ∈ ⟪fV , k′⟫,
log |K ′| = H(K′|fV ).
(24)
(25)
Note that the above choice of K′, if exists, is a feasible choice
of secret key because (25) implies the secrecy constraint (5)
while the recoverability constraint (4) follows from the fact
that k′ is a function of the maximum common function g.
To show that K′ exists, consider fV = gW for some matrix
W and set k′ = gN where N is a matrix whose column
space is the left null space of W . (24) then follows from the
fact that g
[
W N
]
=
[
fV k
′]
is a bijection as
[
W N
]
has full column rank. To show (25), note that the columns of
N cannot be spanned by the columns of W , and so k′ is
independent of fV , i.e.,
H(k′) = H(k′|fV ) = H(K
′|fV ).
It remains to show that k′ is uniformly distributed, i.e.,
log|K ′| = ℓ(k′) = H(k′).
Notice we can choose N to have full column rank, in which
case k′ = gN is uniformly distributed if g is. Since yV ∈ ⟪x⟫,
we can write g as g = xM for some matrix M . We can
choose M to have full column rank, which then implies that
g is uniformly distributed as desired because x is.
Finally, we argue as follows that the secret key rate is not
diminished if K′ is used as the secret key instead.
log |K ′|
(a)
=H(K′|fV )
(b)
≥H(g|fV )
(c)
≥H(K|fV )
(d)
= log |K|, (26)
where (a) is from (25), (b) is due to the fact that g is a linear
function of K′ and fV (24), (c) is from (23) and (d) follows
from the perfect secrecy (5) of K.
Next, we impose the linearity (14b) of the key and show
that that the other constraint (14a) is admissible, i.e., private
randomization is not needed. Consider any user j ∈ V , and
rewrite
[
uj zj
]
as
[
u v
]
by reordering the components such
that u is a component of uj and v contains the rest of the
components of uj and zj . We will argue that u can be removed
without affecting the secret key rate or the discussion rate.
Consider the case where fj does not depend on u. Then, k
also cannot depend on u, or the recoverability constraint (4)
fails. Hence u can be removed as desired. Consider the non-
trivial case where there is a component w of fj such that
w = α.u− β(v)
for some α ∈ Fq\{0} and linear function β. We can also write
k = α′(u) + β′(v) + γ′(fV \{j}),
fj = α
′′(u) + β′′(v),
for some linear functions α′, α′′, β′, β′′ and γ′. Define for i ∈
V ,
f ′i :=
{
fi − α′′
(
w
α
)
= α′′
(
β(v)
α
)
+ β′′(v), if i = j,
fi, otherwise,
k′ := k− α′
(w
α
)
= α′
(
β(v)
α
)
+ β′(v) + γ′(f ′V \{j}).
Note that both k′ and f ′V are independent of u. Furthermore,
ℓ(k) = ℓ(k′)
ℓ(fV ) = ℓ(f
′
V )
H(k|fV )
(a)
=H
(
k− α′
(w
α
)∣∣∣ fV )
(b)
=H(k′|f ′V )
where (a) follows from the fact that w is a component of fi
and (b) is because H(f ′i|fi) = 0 for all i ∈ V . Hence (k
′, f ′V )
is an optimal SKA scheme which does not depend on u, i.e.,
u can be removed.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
With no public discussion, i.e., fV = ∅, by the recoverability
constrain (4), the secret key must be a function of the Ga´cs–
Ko¨rner common information [20] of zV . For finite linear
source, [17, Theorem 4.2] showed that the latter quantity
equals to the r.h.s. of (15), thereby establishing ≤ for (15).
To prove the reverse inequality, note that, we can write the
solution to (15) as g = xM for some matrix M because
zV ∈ ⟪x⟫. Furthermore, M can be chosen to have have
full column rank without loss of optimality, and so g can be
uniformly distributed. Then, the desired secrecy capacity can
be achieved with K = g, where the uniformity of g implies the
secrecy constraint (5) and the recoverability constraint (4) also
follows trivially from the fact that g is a common function.
Converse Part. By Thorem 1, we can assume ℓ(ui) =
0, ∀i ∈ V and K = k ∈ ⟪zV ⟫ without loss of optimality.
Now, since k and fV are functions of zV ,
H(zV ) = H(fV , k, zV )
= H(fV ) +H(k|fV ) +H(zV |fV , k)
=
m∑
i=1
H(fi|f [i−1]) +H(k|fV ) +
m∑
i=1
H(zi|fV , k, z[i−1])
Setting
ri = H(fi|f [i−1]) +H(zi|fV , k, z[i−1]),
the previous equality yields
H(k|fV ) = H(zV )−
m∑
i=1
ri.
Next, we show that rV = (r1, . . . , rm) ∈ R(zV ), where
R(zV ) := {rV | r(B) ≥ H(zB|zV \B), ∀B ( V }.
To that end,
H(zB |zV \B) = H(fV , k, zB|zV \B)
= H(fV |zV \B) +H(k|zV \B, fV )
+H(zB|zV \B, fV , k, )
=
m∑
i=1
H(fi|zV \B, f [i−1]) +H(k|zV \B, fV )
+
∑
i∈B
H(zi|zV \B∪[i−1], fV , k)
≤
∑
i∈B
H(fi|f [i−1]) +
∑
i∈B
H(zi|z[i−1], fV , k)
= r(B)
where the last inequality is because
H(fi|zV \B, f [i−1])
{
= 0 i 6∈ B,
≤ H(f i|f [i−1]) i ∈ B,
and H(k|zV \B, fV ) = 0 by perfect recoverability. Now, since
H(k) is an integer, for rV ∈ R(zV ),
H(k) = H(k|fV ) =
⌊
H(zV )−
m∑
i=1
ri
⌋
≤
⌊
H(zV )− min
rV ∈R(zV )
r(V )
⌋
=
⌊
min
P∈Π′(V )
∑
C∈P H(zC)−H(zV )
|P| − 1
⌋
Achievability Part. For any vector rV ∈ R(zV )∩Zm, it was
shown by [15, Theorem 1] that there exists a corresponding
linear noninteractive discussion scheme which renders omni-
science. Further, it was shown by [19, Corollary 6] that
min
rV ∈R(zV )∩Zm
r(V ) =
⌈
max
P∈Π′(V )
∑
C∈P
H(zV )−H(zC)
|P| − 1
⌉
.
(27)
Consider any optimal solution r∗V to the l.h.s. of (27). Denote
the corresponding linear noninteractive discuss that attains om-
niscience by fV = zVL = x
[
M 1 M2 · · · Mm
]
L =
xT .
Now, it remains to extract a perfect secret key from the
omniscience obtained above. For each realization fV of fV ,
let PfV = {x | xT = fV } be the set of all x which generate
fV . By the definition of the finite linear source, observe that
each entry xi of x is i.i.d. uniform from Fq, i.e., Pr(x =
x) = q−ℓ(x), ∀x. By the linearity of the discussion above, it is
easy to see that |PfV | is the same for all realizations of fV .
Since fV has dimension r
∗(V ), |PfV | = q
ℓ(x)−r∗(V ), ∀fV .
Set K = F
ℓ(x)−r∗(V )
q . For each fV , label each x ∈ PfV
with a unique element in K . Then, upon observing fV , every
user which knows x by omniscience picks the label of x as
the secret key. Since x is uniformly distributed and |PfV | has
the same size, it follows that this random label is uniformly
distributed overK and independent of fV , thereby constituting
a perfect secret key. Therefore,
cS ≥ ℓ(x)− r
∗(V )
= H(z)−
⌈
max
P∈Π′(V )
∑
C∈P
H(zV )−H(zC)
|P| − 1
⌉
=
⌊
min
P∈Π′(V )
∑
C∈P H(zC)−H(zV )
|P| − 1
⌋
.
This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
To prove this theorem, we will need the following lemma.
We say that z′V can be simulated by the source zV if z
′
i ∈
⟪zi⟫ for all i ∈ V .
Lemma 1 If z′V can be simulated by zV , then rS(z
′
V ) ≥
rS(zV ). ✷
PROOF Any secret key generation protocol for z′V can be
simulated by zV . 
Now consider the finite linear source zV =
[
z1 . . . zm
]
on the set of users V , defined by zi ∈ ⟪x⟫ or equivalently,
zi = xM i for each i ∈ V , where M i is a ℓ× ti matrix over
Fq. Set M :=
[
M1 M 2 · · · Mm
]
, so that
zV = xM .
We assume, without loss of generality, that M has full row
rank, so that H(zV ) = H(x) = ℓ. We will let Zi (resp. ZV )
denote the row-space of M i (resp. M ). Since rankFq(M ) =
ℓ, we have dimFq (ZV ) = ℓ, so that ZV
∼= Fℓq .
Let fV be a (non-interactive) linear communication proto-
col, i.e., fV ∈ ⟪zV ⟫, that generates a secret key K using
rS(zV ) symbols from Fq as public communication. Since
rS(zV ) < rCO(zV ), the communication fV is insufficient
for omniscience. Assume that user 1 cannot recover all of
zV from (z1, fV ). Then, via linearity of the source and the
communication, there exists an observation
zV =
[
z1 z2 . . . zm
]
∈ ZV , zV 6= 0,
such that
[
z1 zVA
]
= 0.
Fix a basis b1, b2, . . . , bℓ for ZV , with bℓ = zV as above.
Let M˜ be the matrix having b1, b2, . . . , bℓ, in that order, as
its ℓ rows. Thus, row-space(M˜ ) = row-space(M ) = ZV .
There is then an invertible (change-of-basis) matrix B such
that M = BM˜ . We can now write
zV = xM = xBM˜ = yM˜ ,
where y := xB. Since x1, . . . , xℓ are i.i.d. Unif(Fq) rvs, and
B is invertible, y =
[
y1 y2 . . . yℓ
]
is also composed of
i.i.d. rvs yi uniformly distributed over Fq. Note that the relation
y = xB allows each yj to be expressed as a linear combination
of the xis, and vice versa. Thus,
zV =
ℓ∑
i=1
yibi,
provides an alternative description of the finite linear source
zV .
Since bℓ = zV , we have
zV =
ℓ−1∑
i=1
yibi + yℓzV .
Since z1 = 0 (by choice of zV ), we see that z1 consists of
linear combinations of y1, . . . , yℓ−1 alone. Also, since zVA =
0, the communication
fV = zVA =
(ℓ−1∑
i=1
yibi + yℓzV
)
A =
ℓ−1∑
i=1
yibiA
consists of linear combinations of y1, . . . , yℓ−1 alone. Conse-
quently, the secret key K, which must be generated by user 1
from (z1, fV ), is a function of
[
y1 . . . yℓ−1
]
alone.
Now, for each i ∈ V , we have
zi = xM i = yM˜ i,
with M˜ i := B
−1M i again being a ℓ× ti matrix. Define
V0 := {i ∈ V : the last row of M˜ i is zero}.
For each i ∈ V0, zi is a function of
[
y1 . . . yℓ−1
]
alone; in
this case, set M ′i = M˜ i. On the other hand, for each i /∈ V0,
use elementary column operations to convert M˜ i into an ℓ×ti
matrix M ′i, in which the last row has a single nonzero entry,
occurring in the last column:
M ′i[ℓ, j] =
{
0, j = 1, . . . , ti − 1 = 1,
1, j = l.
Note that for each i ∈ V , we can expressM ′i as M˜ iCi for
some invertible ti×ti matrixCi. (For i ∈ V0,Ci is the identity
matrix.) Set z′i := yM
′
i, so that z
′
i = yM˜ iCi = ziCi. If we
write z′i as
[
z′i,1 . . . z
′
i,ti
]
, then z′i := yM
′
i implies that
- for i ∈ V0, z′i is a function of
[
y1 . . . yℓ−1
]
alone;
and
- for i /∈ V0, only z′i,ti is of the form
∑ℓ
j=1 αjyj , with
αℓ 6= 0; all other components z′i,j , j = 1, . . . , ti − 1, are
functions of
[
y1 . . . yℓ−1
]
alone.
For each i /∈ V0, consider the communication fi from user
i: write f i as ziAi for a suitable matrix Ai. We then have
fi = z
′
iC
−1
i Ai = z
′
iA
′
i,
with A′i := C
−1
i Ai. Since the overall communication fV
consists of linear combinations of y1, . . . , yℓ−1 alone, it must
be the case that the last row of A′i is zero. Hence, fi = z
#
i A
#
i ,
where z
#
i :=
[
z′i,1 . . . z
′
i,ti−1
]
, and A
#
i is A
′
i with the last
row deleted. For i ∈ V0, we simply set z
#
i = z
′
i andA
#
i = A
′
i,
so that we again have fi = z
#
i A
#
i .
For each i ∈ V , z#i is a function only of
[
y1 . . . yℓ−1
]
,
so that for z
#
V :=
[
z
#
1 . . . z
#
m
]
, we have
H(z#V ) ≤ H(y1, . . . , yℓ−1) = (ℓ− 1) < H(zV ).
Note that z
#
V is a finite linear source, since z
#
i = yM
#
i ,
where M
#
i is either equal to M
′
i (for i ∈ V0) or is equal
toM ′i with its last row deleted (for i /∈ V0). Moreover, z
#
V can
be simulated by zV . Explicitly, for each i ∈ V0, z
#
i is equal
to ziCi (= z
′
i), and for each i /∈ V0, z
#
i is equal to ziCi
(= z′i) with its last component deleted. Our arguments above
show that the communication fV = zVA is a non-interactive
linear communication for z
#
V as well. Finally, we argue below
that the secret key K can be generated from (z#i , fV ) for each
i ∈ V . Hence, rS(z
#
V ) ≤ rS(zV ), which along with Lemma 1
proves the theorem.
For user i to generate K, it must be a function of (zi, fV ).
Equivalently, K is a function of (z′i, fV ), since z
′
i is an
invertible function of zi. We claim that K is in fact a function
of (z#i , fV ). This is trivially true for i ∈ V0, so assume i /∈ V0.
We say that a function f(y1, . . . , yn) is functionally dependent
on the variable yn if there exist y
′
1, . . . , y
′
n, and y
′′
n 6= y
′
n
such that f(y′1, . . . , y
′
n−1, y
′
n) 6= f(y
′
1, . . . , y
′
n−1, y
′′
n). Note
that f(y1, . . . , yn) is in fact a function of y1, . . . , yn−1 alone
iff it is not functionally dependent on yn. We will argue that
for i /∈ V0, K is not functionally dependent on z′i,ti .
Suppose, to the contrary, that K is functionally dependent on
z′i,ti for some i /∈ V0. Then there exist two distinct realizations,
say, u and v, of (z′i, fV ) that differ only in the component z
′
i,ti
,
which result in two distinct values of K: K(u) 6= K(v). The
realizations u and v share a common value of (z#i , fV ), which
is a function of
[
y1 . . . yℓ−1
]
alone. Hence, there exists a
realization of
[
y1 . . . yℓ−1
]
that determines the realization
of (z#i , fV ) common to u and v. Now, Z
′
i,ti
=
∑ℓ
j=1 αjyj with
αℓ 6= 0, so a given realization of
[
y1 . . . yℓ−1
]
only suffices
to determine the term
∑ℓ−1
j=1 αjyj . Thus, we need two distinct
realizations of yℓ, say, y
′ and y′′, to determine the values of the
component Z ′i,ti in which u and v differ. In other words, u and
v are determined, respectively, by
[
y1 . . . yℓ−1 yℓ = y
′
]
and
[
y1 . . . yℓ−1 yℓ = y
′′
]
for some y′ 6= y′′. This makes
K functionally dependent on yℓ, which is impossible since,
as seen earlier, K is a function only of
[
y1 . . . yℓ−1
]
.This
proves that K cannot be functionally dependent on z′i,ti , and
hence, K is a function of (z#i , fV ), as desired.
This proves that there exists a reduced source, z
#
V , of zV
obtained by linear processing with rS(z
#
V ) = rS(zV ).
